Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 1
Number 1 Fall

Article 8

January 1971

Myres S. McDougal: Pinoeer for the Year 2010
Richard A. Falk

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Falk, Myres S. McDougal: Pinoeer for the Year 2010, 1 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 13 (1971).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

MYRES S. McDOUGAL:
PIONEER FOR THE YEAR 2010
RICHARD A.

FALK*

Writing against the bloody mainstream of our history,
Myres S. McDougal has dedicated his life to a demonstration of
how law might contribute to a more valuable human existence
at all levels of political organization. In this brief comment I
shall confine myself to his contributions to world order studies,
the area wherein Professor McDougal has concentrated his
efforts for more than twenty years and a subject matter
wherein the relevance of law seems to be persistently put in
question by the words and actions of statesmen.
The central endeavor of Professor McDougal, and the impressive array of first-rank scholars who have joined in the
enterprise form what might be designated "an intellectual collective" which I have labeled elsewhere as the "New Haven
approach,"' has been to demonstrate that international law is
useful if appropriately conceived 2 and that international law
is used, whether wittingly or not, by decision-makers trying
to balance assertions of self-interest against probable counterassertions in a way that is mutually satisfactory. In this respect, the case for normative relevance ultimately rests in our
historical period on the universal need to discourage the kind
of violence that might generate recourse to nuclear weapons.
McDougal's writings have been sensitive to this overriding consideration, as well as to the conflicting tendencies among principal states for world dominance. In this respect, McDougal's
writings presuppose the beneficial influence exerted by the
United States and allied liberal democracies upon foreign societies and the corespondingly detrimental influence exerted by
'3
the Sino-Soviet group of actors denominated as "totalitarian.
As such, the central tension in McDougal's thinking is between
the universalistic criteria of world order and the particularistic
criteria of American foreign policy. By historical circumstance,
* Milbank Professor of International Law, Princeton University.
I

See R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 342 (1970);

Gidon Gottlieb has reached the same kind of judgment under the rubric

of "the Yale approach". G. GOTTLIEB, The Conceptual World of the Yale
School of InternationalLaw, WORLD POLmCS 108 (1968).
2 It is more accurate to conclude that McDougal and his associates have
recast the traditional perspectives of "international law" in a more broadly
conceived framework of "world public order."
3 This element in McDougal's thinking is made particularly clear in McDougal and Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, in McDOUGAL et al. STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
3-41 (1960).
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in part, there is increasing evidence that the course of American foreign policy is not compatible with any adequate conception of world order, even one that is modest in its assertion of constraints. 4 America's involvement in the Indochina
War has exposed vividly-what was latent all along-that
international struggles could not be divided for normative purposes by reference to the ideological affinities of the contending
factions. For one thing, the anti-Communist faction might be
repressive and totalitarian; secondly, the Communist faction
may derive its strength from nationalism and socialism rather
than from the sort of bureaucratic totalism we associate with
the Soviet Union and its satellites; thirdly, if the ratio of forces
is strongly against the anti-Communist side it prompts highly
destructive reliance on a military strategy to reverse a political
defeat; fourthly, if the setting of struggle is a low-technology
society, then the intervention of high-technology weaponry almost necessarily ravages the country if the Communist-oriented
faction has a firm base of popular support. These factors are
all present in Indochina and have increasingly led international
law critics to shift the discussion from a debate on norms to an
inquiry into personal responsibility for the commission of war
crimes in a Nuremberg sense. Telford Taylor's book, NUREMBURG
AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY, represents a sober but
decisive acknowledgement that the American response to Communist challenges in Indochina culminated in a course of conduct, not isolated acts, that was criminal and that implicates
American decision-makers at the highest levels of civilian and
military command. 5 From an international lawyer's perspective
such criminality represents a decisive demonstration that American foreign policy-even if oriented toward resisting the expansion of Communist influence-is not necessarily compatible
with adherence to minimal imperatives of world order."
4

5

The most significant attempt to argue the contrary position has been
developed by Professor John Norton Moore, a scholar deeply and visibly
influenced by his association with McDougal, in an influential series of
articles. For a recent example of his approach see Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
38 (1971).
Neil Sheehan, writing a long essay review in the Sunday New York Times
Review, concluded that "If you credit as factual only a fraction of the
information assembled here about what happened in Vietnam, and if you
apply the laws of war to American conduct there, then the leaders of
the United States for the past six years including the incumbent President Richard Milhous Nixon, may well be guilty of war crimes." N.Y.
Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 7 (Magazine) at 1, col. 4; for an effort to apply
the war crimes reasoning succinctly to the issue of impeachment see

R. Falk, Why Impeachment, THE

NEW REPUBLIC,

May 1, 1971, at 13.

6 And may not, indeed sustain the integrity of legal process within the
domestic polity. The government reliance on vague conspiracy indictments to prosecute anti-war activities is one indication of domestic spillover from an international course of lawlessness.

MYRES S. McDOUGAL

I hope that Professor McDougal will feel the need to reformulate some of his analysis in light of the Indochina experience, although it is of greater consequence for a potential biographer than for future students of world order. I find it remarkable that, despite my disagreements with McDougal on
levels of policy application, I find his basic orientation to the
7
subject matter of world order studies as valuable as ever.
The shortcomings of his analysis involve, in my judgment,
errors of historical interpretation both with respect to the values
actually animating American foreign policy and as to the world
setting, but these shortcomings do not undercut the effort to
achieve a comprehensive view of world order, oriented toward
the achievement of human dignity and conceived in the dynamic mood of process.8
In two crucial respects, I think recent developments have
proven McDougal even more correct than earlier: first, shifting attention from the traditional concern with "international
law" to the wider domain of "world public order;" secondly,
insisting for reasons of pragmatic and ideological necessity that
the foreign policy process be governed by a secure normative
framework. 9 Both of these achievements have, in my judgment,
great consequence for the survival potential of world civilization, and as such, rank among the prime successes of humanistic
studies in our times. Suppose we assume that by the year
2010 there exists a world system that has generally overcome
the fundamental challenges of war, poverty, pollution, and

7 In actuality, McDougal has devoted comparatively little of his scholarly

energy to supporting his interpretation of the current world political
scene. Among the mcre important examples of scholarship responding
to current issues are M. McDoUGAL & N. SCHLEI, The Hydrogen Bomb
Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, STUDIES, supra note
3, 763-843; McDoUGAL, The Soviet Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense,
57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963); McDOUGAL & GOODMAN, Chinese Participation in the United Nations: The Legal Imperatives of a Negotiaated Solution, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1966); McDOUGAL, Foreward in

R. HULL & J. NOVOGRAD, LAW AND VIETNAM vii-ix (1968).
s In contrast to the static mood cf structure; of course, a total understanding

partakes of both moods, and McDougal's thinking is sensitive to this

necessity.
this sense, McDougal confronts directly the Kennan-MorgenthauAcheson critique of legalism in international relations. For a recent instance of where this critique has been carried particularly far, presenting
an extreme set-off against normative-prescriptive ways of approaching
international relations, see M. COPELAND, THE GAME OF NATIONS 19-26

9 In

(1969).
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oppression.' 0 A biographer trying to recreate the intellectual
roots of such a positive outcome could hardly do better than
fo explicate the life and work of Professor McDougal, whose
clarity of vision, seriousness of commitment, and extent of
impact towered so far above his contemporaries as to be virtually invisible. In this sense, of norm-oriented thinking about
the future, without succumbing to the easy diversion of utopianism, 1 McDougal is without peers.

10 If these dramatic aspirations are not substantially realized by the year

2010, then it is highly likely that processes of decay and distegration will
culminate in some planetary catastrophe of an irreversible character long
before that date. In THIS ENDANGERED PLANET (1971) I argue that future
world order depends on the directions of dominant consciousness that
come to prevail in the next few decades, and that the outcome will result
in either dramatic improvement or failure. The alternative lines of
positive and negative development are outlined in plausible sequence in
Chapter IX, 415-437.
11 Note, however, that the design of credible utopias, especially if accompanied by implementing strategies, is a highly creative and constructive
intellectual exercise.

